NEWSLETTER 18 NOV 2026 *WHAT'S NEW IN THE COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW WORLD?*

Comparative Administrative Law Scholarship Corner

Affiliation with the Yale Comparative Administrative Law Listserv

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Regulatory Rationales in the Face of Emerging Technologies: A Systematic Review

Regulation & Governance, Vol. 21, Issue 1, Jan 2027

Aylmer, Tara Kerins
Hall, Tom

Technology is evolving, and so is the discussion of regulation theory among academics. Taking a unique approach to legal research, this paper utilizes the systematic literature review methodology to uncover quantitative evidence on the current consensus among academics on regulation theory, in particular, regulatory rationales. This paper seeks to determine whether the narrative assumptions that social solidarity-based regulatory rationales have become more prevalent as technology has evolved are correct. Based on the data gathered, this article asserts that the discussion of regulatory rationales is facing a tonal shift as a result of artificial intelligence. Academics are shifting away from a traditional economic view of regulation toward discussion of regulatory rationales based on protecting the common good. This should be welcome. Social solidarity should serve as a foundational principle of good technology regulation. Through applying the principles of social solidarity, regulators can better balance the risks and benefits of modern technology.

Way Off TRAC: Judicial Approaches to Claims of Unreasonable Delay for Visa Applications in Administrative Processing

94 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1250

Borah, Charlie

Visa applicants who bring claims of unreasonable delay after having their applications placed in administrative processing face varied and disparate approaches within judicial districts and between circuits. Three approaches have developed: Some courts have declined to review on the grounds of consular nonreviewability, some have ruled that consular officers have no duty to further review an application placed in administrative processing, and others have reviewed these cases under the general standard set forth for reviewing claims of unreasonable delay against agencies.
This Essay makes three main arguments. First, it argues that consular nonreviewability does not apply to visa applications placed in administrative processing because such placement does not constitute a final decision. Second, this Essay explains that consular officers have a nondiscretionary duty to adjudicate a visa to a final decision after it has been placed in administrative processing. Finally, this Essay argues that the factors used to evaluate claims of unreasonable delay for visa applications that have been placed in administrative processing have shifted far from their original meaning and intent—and now weigh too heavily in the government's favor. This Essay proposes that the factors be interpreted according to their original meaning and intent, which did not favor the government so heavily.

Form Before Capability? AI Governance Adoption, Functional Capability, and the Limits of Index-Based Evidence in the Global South

Regulation & Governance, Vol. 21, Issue 1, Jan 2027

Brik, Anis Ben

Governments across the developing world have adopted artificial intelligence governance instruments at high speed, though the relationship between formal adoption and the capability to operate those instruments remains poorly understood. This article asks whether the expansion of AI governance architecture across the Global South has been matched by the functional capabilities on which regulatory effectiveness depends, and what explains the answer. Drawing on panel data for 82 countries across five Global South regions and six waves of the Government AI Readiness Index, it reports that within the period of stable index architecture (2020–2024) measures of regulatory form rose by 20.3 points on a 0–100 scale while measures of functional capability rose by 0.4 points, a within-country differential present in 90% of sample countries and surviving removal of the single step-scored indicator of national strategy adoption. The pattern of the differential discriminates among explanations: formal adoption rose four times faster in states in the top quartile of administrative capacity than in the bottom quartile, where capability fell; the most aid-dependent states adopted least; and the differential is unrelated to regime type. This is inconsistent with the view that legislation is simply quicker to produce than infrastructure and with the view that adoption is decoupled from performance for external audiences, and consistent with adoption conditioned on administrative capacity, in which capability in the weakest states erodes while capability in stronger states grows more slowly than the instruments that depend on it. Vietnam and India are developed as confirming and deviant cases. Cross-national dispersion widened on both dimensions, and patterns that appear only when the 2025 wave is included cannot be separated from the redesign of the index in that year.

Against Correctness Review of Policy Interpretation

Modern Law Review, Published November 25, 2026

Chng, Kenny

Administrative policies are widely used in governance to guide decision-making. But they are not always clear on their face and have to be interpreted. The English courts have claimed the authority to interpret policies on a correctness standard. This raises two important questions. First, what is a correct policy interpretation? Second, should courts review policy interpretations for correctness? This paper will aim to answer these questions. I will first argue that if courts were to review policy interpretations for correctness, a purposive approach should be adopted to determine whether a policy interpretation is correct, with adjustments to adapt the approach to the context of policies. However, I will then argue that policy interpretations should be reviewed for reasonableness and not correctness. Three reasons weigh in favour of reasonableness review: expertise, the nature of policy interpretation, and variability. I will then respond to four arguments that can be raised in support of correctness review: consistency, a concern about vague policies, the scope of power of public bodies, and doctrinal coherence.

Closing Adjudicative Discretion

112 Cornell Law Review (forthcoming 2027)

Feinzig, Joshua Michael

Can an agency turn a delegated "may" into a "must"? Congress frequently grants agencies discretion to provide immigration relief, issue benefits or licenses, or waive statutory requirements. Yet agencies sometimes supplant these judgments with categorical rules. Whether they may do so marks a longstanding but undertheorized instability in the meaning of discretionary authority and its allocation within agencies. This instability has acquired renewed urgency as political leaders seek to suppress adjudicator discretion, particularly in immigration, and as machine-driven governance raises parallel concerns about the "fettering" of discretion through uncritical reliance on algorithmic recommendations.

The dominant modern view treats the conversion of "may" into "must" as an ordinary incident of agency hierarchy. Where Congress authorizes rather than mandates an outcome, so the thinking goes, agency leaders may decide how much discretion, if any, to leave to subordinates. But a competing tradition understands discretion not merely as opening a space of permissible outcomes, but as entailing a mode of decisionmaking marked by flexible and contextual judgment. On this alternative view, an agency entrusted with discretion must preserve room for its exercise, which may require leaving some decisional leeway to the adjudicator at the point of decision.

Drawing on judicial doctrine, internal agency materials, and contemporaneous legal thought, I reconstruct these rival conceptions and trace a historical transformation in the legal meaning of discretionary authority. The discretion-preserving conception emerged from the traditions of equity jurisdiction and remained a central feature of administrative legality well into the mid-twentieth century. Only as administrative law confronted the problems of excessive and unstructured frontline discretion over the 1960s and 1970s did it gradually lose sight of its complementary role in preserving case-level discretion against the pressures of centralization and routinization.

There is reason now, however, to revisit this transformation and ultimately reinvigorate the discretion-preserving tradition. The intellectual and doctrinal foundations of the modern understanding have eroded in important respects. Meanwhile, executive consolidation has shifted the balance of institutional concerns, such that the principal threat to administrative justice today lies not in excessive frontline discretion but in its top-down suppression. And the challenges posed by algorithmic fettering have exposed a gap in administrative legality that a contemporary revitalization of this tradition can help fill.

Resisting Epistemic Injustice and Unresponsive Regulation: Testimonies From Unmarried Couples

Regulation & Governance, Vol. 21, Issue 1, Jan 2027

Geffen-Spitz, Hila

Theoretical studies on responsive regulation and epistemic justice rarely examine how epistemic and regulatory dimensions operate together in administrative systems where citizens must (re-)verify their eligibility for formally-granted rights. In the case of Israel, despite extensive legal recognition of common-law partnerships, unmarried couples face invasive verification demands and systematic credibility deficits that married couples bypass entirely. Epistemic injustice enables regulatory unresponsiveness by providing justification for fragmented bureaucracy and intrusive treatment, while unresponsive regulation actively reproduces epistemic injustice, positioning unmarried couples as less credible. Notwithstanding, rather than accepting marginalization, such couples resist by identifying alternative knowledge networks, documentation sources, and recognition frameworks. This article (i) demonstrates how epistemic injustice and regulatory unresponsiveness function as mutually constitutive forces in unmarried couples' lived experiences; (ii) theorizes unmarried couples' proactive epistemic resistance; and (iii) beyond the Israeli context, articulates design principles for more epistemically just responsive regulation that is grounded in participants' experiential and positional knowledge.

The Worst Anti-Citizenship Arguments

Chicago-Kent Law Review (forthcoming), Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 26-40.

Gowder, Paul A

The Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause is written in direct and categorical language: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." Yet several scholars and lawyers have tortured those words to support Donald Trump's effort to strip citizenship from disfavored classes of Americans. This Essay unpacks and refutes two of the most obscure and incoherent-yet perhaps superficially credible?-arguments against birthright citizenship.
It first briefly addresses the claim, offered by the government in Trump v. Barbara, that the word "reside" somehow supports to the notion that the applicability of the Citizenship Clause depends on the domicile of a newborn's parents. It then offers an extended exegesis and critique of Richard Epstein's contention that the Citizenship Clause must be read to be consistent with the 1790 and 1795 Naturalization Acts, and thus to not only import a tie between parental status and the status of children but also to permit a racial criterion for membership.

Reviving the Impetuous Vortex: The Contemporary Puzzle of Congressional Power

University of Chicago Law School, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 26-31, (forthcoming, - Boston University Law Review - (2027)

Huq, Aziz Z.
Ginsburg, Tom

In a series of sharply-argued concurrences, Justice Neil Gorsuch has diagnosed a troubling emasculation of Congress's animal spirits, and has mapped out a remedy for that problem consonant with the Roberts Court's rapid-paced jurisprudence on the separation of powers. James Madison famously deemed the legislative branch na "impetuous vortex" albeit in speaking of then-extant "American constitutions" in the newly independent states. On Justice Gorsuch's telling, the contemporary conjuncture inverts Madison's worry. Rather than "everywhere extending the sphere of its activities," Congress has "increasingly assigned broad powers" to federal agencies; rather than deliberating and legislating in detail, it has been too "tempted to delegate power to agencies." Gorsuch posited that once delegations are made, they are near-impossible to "retrieve[]" in the teeth of the president's veto power. The Court, he bemoans, has sharpened Congress's incentive to buck-pass by allowing agency leaders to be
insulated from presidential removal. So enervated, Congress has slid into sloppily crafted legislation, and careless dispersals of its rule-making power. Gorsuch's critique, particularly as articulated in his concurring opinion in Trump v. Slaughter, is congruent with concerns expressed elsewhere in the scholarly literature (and this symposium) about the expansion in de jure and de facto presidential authorities. Justice Gorsuch's proposed solution also resonates with those executive-branch-focused concerns: Restore Congress as a co-equal branch by limiting its authority to "assign[] broad powers" to federal agencies, and strictly construe statutory text to furnish legislators with the appropriate incentives to pull up their constitutional socks and start acting as a co-equal branch, in lieu of evading "accountabl[ity] for unpopular actions." If an imbalance between Congress and the executive branch is the problem, does Justice Gorsuch offer a real solution? We make four points in this essay. First, Justice Gorsuch's diagnosis of congressional lassitude correctly isolates a defect in American democratic institutions: Legislation—its production through public deliberation and disagreement, and then
its constraining force upon private and public actors once it's in force—is central to the project of sustained representative democracy of the kind that dominates the modern era. Second, the Gorsuch remedy fails to address the most likely sources of congressional dysfunction. These causes are both internal—arising from how Congress organizes its own operations—and external—a function of incentive structure generated by electoral competition. Most of these causal chains lie beyond the remedial reach of the Court, and to the extent the Justices are relevant, they have made matters worse. Third, a congressional reform project needs a definition of what counts as success and also a sense of how internal and external reforms are to be sequenced or combined. Neither of these analytic tasks is straightforward. Finally, and in conclusion, we note a possibility that the problem that Justice Gorsuch diagnoses is likely resistant to institutional reform—in the sense that its provenance is to be found in the underlying distribution of voters' preferences. The fault, that is, may not be in the constitutional constellation, but ourselves.

Regulatory impact assessment as the procedural infrastructure of regulation: procedural legitimacy and criteria for reviewing the reasoning of regulatory agencies

Revista ESASP, No. 52(2026); Published: 2026-11-12

Iizuka, Fernanda Oppermann

The institutionalisation of regulatory impact assessment (RIA) by Laws No. 13,848/2019 and No. 13,874/2019 and Decree No. 10,411/2020 expanded the formal requirements governing Brazilian federal rulemaking, particularly by regulatory agencies, but reports and consultations do not ensure that the instrument shapes deliberation. This article examines under what normative and institutional conditions RIA can contribute to the procedural legitimacy of agencies' normative decisions and which review criteria follow from those conditions. It adopts a doctrinal legal method, supported by bibliographical and documentary review, published empirical studies of Brazilian practice, rulings of the Federal Court of Accounts and the Federal Supreme Court, and an illustrative analysis of an RIA produced by the National Civil Aviation Agency. The article argues that RIA contributes to legitimacy when it organises a public and reviewable chain of reasons, which depends on linking problem definition, comparison of alternatives, participation, reason-giving and ex post evaluation, as well as on institutional capacity. Six review criteria are derived from this premise, each anchored in positive law and associated with graduated legal consequences, together with a narrow reading of Article 21 of Decree No. 10,411/2020. The proposed review intensifies scrutiny of reasoning without replacing the regulatory choice.

Untethered: How the Roberts Court is Rethinking the Law-Policy Relationship

Written: April 23, 2026; Posted: October 10, 2026

Johnson, Bennett

The Roberts Court has sought to separate law from policy. Yet judicial review has long used doctrines that give weight to democratic policymaking, public goods, and empirical evidence. This Essay examines the Court's retreat from these "law-policy tethers," including constitutional tiers of scrutiny, Chevron deference, and consideration of the public interest. It argues that this shift risks expanding judicial power and weakening respect for agency expertise and democratic accountability. Although formalist methods promise clarity and predictability, they can make judicial discretion less visible. Removing policy tethers may therefore make policy choices less transparent rather than remove them from judicial review.

Federal Records in Agency Proceedings

94 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1089

Kwoka, Margaret B.

The federal government holds a vast repository of documents, including records about individuals' finances, health, interactions with the criminal justice system, immigration histories, and military service. For current or former government employees, agencies may hold personnel records, ethics information, and financial disclosures. For private businesses, government agencies may have licensing or inspection records, required filings for publicly traded companies, and permitting information. The federal government collects and maintains this information as part of its routine administration of government programs.
For many agency determinations, the records that an agency already possesses are critical to the proceedings. Yet federal government practices vary widely in how agency decision-makers obtain the relevant government records. At one end, the agency bends over backward to gather all the relevant documents itself. At the other extreme, agencies rely on individuals to gather records on their own, including by making Freedom of Information Act requests.
This Article explores the range of agency practices in obtaining government records for use in their proceedings. Drawing on the extant legal requirements for the provision of records to the public in various proceedings and on interviews that the Author conducted with government officials about their agencies' practices, this Article evaluates these practices against the fundamental objectives of fairness, efficiency, and accuracy in agency proceedings. It proposes a framework for considering those values in different contexts, including determinations related to enforcement, benefits, licensing, and contracts or grants, and suggests this framework can help agencies approach the question of how best to obtain relevant information.

Born to Govern or to Extract? Party Types Across Administrative Levels in Colombia

Regulation & Governance, Vol. 21, Issue 1, Jan 2027

Lara-Rodríguez, Juan Sebastián

Research on parties and corruption classifies them by ideology, while subnational studies set the party aside for the candidate. Indeed, organizational origin remains untested as a structured typology. I classify parties as traditional, personalistic, ethnic, rebel-origin, or neo-Pentecostal across three governmental levels. Operationalizing Attorney General prosecutorial records for 2011–2020, I build a composite corruption indicator for 1122 Colombian municipalities and estimate fixed effects, spatial, and regression discontinuity models. Rebel-origin parties and citizen-signature movements are associated with lower corruption, while traditional and personalistic types are indistinguishable. The ethnic category turns negative once parties whose origin and trajectory diverged are excluded, and tests of contested assignments strengthen the results. Voter turnout is positively associated with municipal corruption, a result that omitted variables do not account for. At the presidential level, however, party type loses significance. How a party was built, rather than its label, is therefore decisive for understanding municipal corruption.

Local Government and the Territorial Constitution: Social Justice and Local Finances in the UK

Published in 27 Oct 2026; ISBN 978-1529245615; Bristol University Press

Marique, Yseult
Vaccari, Eugenio

As devolution transforms governance across the UK, local authorities face unprecedented challenges in delivering services whilst managing severe budgetary constraints. This book investigates and provides insights into how local governments operate within Britain's evolving constitutional framework.
This comprehensive edited collection examines the realities of devolved powers across England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, revealing why simply transferring responsibilities from Westminster hasn't reduced social inequalities. The authors identify critical pressure points — from inadequate expertise to accountability failures — that undermine local governance effectiveness.
Essential reading for public administration scholars, policy makers, and practitioners seeking evidence-based solutions to strengthen local democracy and promote social justice through better territorial governance.

L'invention de la Constitution administrative américaine: Les cent années perdues du droit administratif (The Invention of the American Administrative Constitution: The Lost Hundred Years of Administrative Law)

Published in 15 Oct 2026; L'Harmattan

Mashaw, Jerry L

L'État administratif est-il une invention récente, contraire à l'esprit de la Constitution américaine? La pensée juridique dominante aux États-Unis a longtemps présenté le développement des agences administratives au XXe siècle comme une rupture avec le modèle constitutionnel originel, fondé sur une stricte séparation des pouvoirs.
Dans cet ouvrage devenu un classique de l'histoire du droit administratif américain, Jerry L. Mashaw renverse cette lecture. À partir d'une analyse minutieuse des pratiques institutionnelles du premier siècle de la République, il montre que, dès les débuts des États-Unis, le Congrès a confié d'importants pouvoirs discrétionnaires aux autorités administratives, chargées de prendre des décisions, d'édicter des règles et d'assurer l'application de la loi. Bien avant l'émergence des grandes agences fédérales, une véritable « constitution administrative » était déjà à l'œuvre, façonnée moins par le texte constitutionnel que par les pratiques gouvernementales.
En restituant ce siècle oublié de l'histoire administrative américaine, Jerry Mashaw remet en cause l'idée selon laquelle l'État administratif constituerait une déviation moderne ou une menace pour la démocratie constitutionnelle. Son étude offre une nouvelle compréhension des rapports entre administration, Parlement et pouvoir judiciaire, tout en éclairant les débats contemporains sur la légitimité du pouvoir administratif.
À la croisée de l'histoire, du droit constitutionnel et du droit administratif, cet ouvrage s'est imposé comme une référence incontournable pour tous ceux qui s'intéressent aux origines de l'État administratif et à l'évolution des institutions publiques américaines.

Translated by IA:

Is the administrative state a recent invention, contrary to the spirit of the American Constitution? Mainstream legal thought in the United States has long portrayed the growth of administrative agencies in the twentieth century as a break with the original constitutional model, which rested on a strict separation of powers.
In this book, now a classic of American administrative law history, Jerry L. Mashaw overturns that reading. Through a meticulous analysis of institutional practices during the Republic's first century, he shows that from the earliest days of the United States, Congress entrusted administrative authorities with substantial discretionary powers to make decisions, issue rules, and enforce the law. Long before the rise of the great federal agencies, a genuine "administrative constitution" was already at work, shaped less by the constitutional text than by governmental practice.
By recovering this forgotten century of American administrative history, Jerry Mashaw challenges the notion that the administrative state is a modern deviation or a threat to constitutional democracy. His study offers a new understanding of the relationship between the administration, Congress, and the judiciary, while shedding light on contemporary debates over the legitimacy of administrative power.
Standing at the intersection of history, constitutional law, and administrative law, this book has become an essential reference for anyone interested in the origins of the administrative state and the evolution of American public institutions.

Revisiting Presidential Reorganization

94 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1153

Ponomarenko, Maria

For much of the twentieth century, Congress repeatedly delegated to presidents the authority to "reorganize" the executive branch. Presidents from both parties used this authority to create agencies, consolidate functions, shift responsibilities across the bureaucracy, and otherwise reshape the administrative state. Although Congress reserved the right to "veto" proposals with which it disagreed, the streamlined process established under the various Reorganization Acts nevertheless smoothed the way for bureaucratic change. All of this came to an end in 1984 when Congress allowed the last of the Reorganization Acts to expire.
This Article revisits the fifty-year history of executive reorganization. It explains why it lasted as long as it did, why it ultimately came to an end, and why now might be the time to consider restoring the authority anew. It demonstrates that the Reorganization Acts offered a way for presidents to work with legislators to build new administrative capacity and improve agency governance in ways that were especially likely to stall in the ordinary legislative process. And it shows that the case for executive reorganization may, if anything, be even stronger today. In particular, it argues that executive reorganization has the potential to address, at least to some extent, a growing asymmetry in public law—namely, the degree to which the status quo makes it easier for presidents to destroy existing administrative capacity than to build it anew.

What is Wrong With Canadian Insolvency Law: Utilitarianism, the Purpose Error, and the Erosion of the Separation of Powers

Canadian Bar Review (forthcoming)

Sabzevari, Aminollah

This article argues that Canadian insolvency law has been shaped by act utilitarianism and the "purpose error" in statutory interpretation, emphasizing abstract purposes at the expense of the statutory framework. Parliament adopted a form of rule utilitarianism in commercial insolvency law-one that balances competing policy objectives and protects minority creditors through carefully structured means-ends choices. Courts have increasingly departed from this architecture in pursuit of case-specific outcomes, an approach that favours secured creditors. Using reverse vesting orders and third-party releases as recent examples, this article reviews how the purpose error drives jurisdictional analysis, displacing text, context, and the secondary purposes selected by Parliament. It reviews why insolvency law is particularly vulnerable to the purpose error and why addressing it requires both legislative clarification and a renewed judicial commitment to interpretive discipline to preserve the separation of powers and maintain the rule of law.

Proportionality in Administrative Law

94 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1017

Walker, Christopher J.

In this era of rapid change in administrative law—both at the Supreme Court and from the White House—the foreword to The Law Review's annual administrative law issue presents a timely opportunity to take stock of the future of regulatory governance. This Foreword argues that, especially in this time of flux, we should seek to embrace proportionality as an organizing principle in administrative law. The more important or impactful a regulatory action, the more involved Congress should be in making the major value judgments, the more procedure we should require from agencies, and the more searching review we should expect from courts. The converse is also true. For minor regulatory actions where agencies merely fill up the details of a statutory scheme, we should deproceduralize at the agency level and expect light-touch judicial review. In between the major and minor actions, the role of Congress, the extent of agency procedures, and the scope of judicial review should be calibrated, where possible, to be proportional to the importance of the regulatory action.

There have been hints of proportionality in recent years. The Supreme Court, for instance, has introduced a major questions doctrine, which requires a clear statement from Congress to delegate significant value judgments to federal agencies. It has also focused on proportionality when it comes to statutory interpretation and agency delegations, arbitrary-and-capricious review of agency policymaking under the Administrative Procedure Act, and officer status under Article II of the U.S. Constitution. In October Term 2024, the Court recognized the importance of proportionality when it limited the scope of injunctive relief in Trump v. CASA and rebuffed a nondelegation doctrine challenge in Federal Communications Commission v. Consumers' Research. Within the executive branch, we have also seen some embrace of proportionality. For instance, in the first Trump Administration, the Department of Transportation via internal administrative law adopted formal rulemaking for its most important rules. And in the Biden Administration, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs doubled the threshold for centralized review of agency rulemaking to significant rules that have at least a $200 million economic impact. This Foreword argues that the Supreme Court and the executive branch can and should embrace proportionality on their own in many respects and documents the ways they have already done so. To fully implement this vision, however, Congress must get involved to ingrain proportionality in administrative law and regulatory practice.

Events and Informations:

- **Call for papers:** Droit Public Comparé – Comparative Public Law
  Deadline for abstract proposal: **December 1, 2026;** Deadline for full paper: **May 1, 2027 – for more information, click here**
- **Webinar Regulatory Studies Center – The George Washington University:** Executive Innovation Series: After Debt, Demographics, Deglobalization, Digitalization and Disruption—What's Left in Our Wallets? **December 3, 2026 – for more information, click here**
- **2026 ABA Administrative Law Fall Virtual Conference:** American Bar Association – Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice: **December 3-4, 2026 | Virtual – for more information, click here**
- **Call for Presenters & Commentators:** New Voices in Administrative Law (The AALS Section on Administrative Law): **Friday, Jan. 8, from 11:10am-12:25pm - for more information click here**
- **22nd General Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law (IACL) Berlin – for more information, click here**
- **Call for papers:** Special Issue Administrative Law and Governance in Contemporary States **– for more information, click here (Deadline: May 30, 2027)**
- **Call for papers:** Duke Law Journal 57th Annual Administrative Law Symposium **February 26, 2027,** at Duke University School of Law, North Carolina **– for more information, click here**

Please contact the editor at his e-mail with your comments, information, questions or suggestions for our Comparative Administrative Law listserv.
